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INVESTIGATING 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(B): STATE-COURT
REVIEW OF NPDES PERMIT CERTIFICATIONS
Tad Macfarlan*
This Note investigates the wisdom and validity of 40 CER. § 124.55(b), a Clean
Water Act regulation promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) as part of the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permitting program. The Clean Water Act provides affected states with an oppor-
tunity to certify federally administered NDES permits before issuance by EPA.
State certification is a meaningful moment in water quality regulation, and judi-
cial review of these critical decisions takes place in state courts. Unfortunately, 40
C.ER. § 124.55(b), designed to bring certainty and finality to permit-holders, ef-
fectively removes state courts from the process of ensuring that state certifications
are legally sufficient after permit issuance. In doing so, the regulation dismantles
an essential tool of the Clean Water Act. It also renders 40 CER. § 124.55(b) in-
valid. Thus, 40 C.ER. § 124.55(b) should be repealed by EPA or invalidated by
the courts, so that environmental organizations can effectively challenge illegal
state certifications. While significant legal obstacles-standing, jurisdiction, and
statutes of limitations, to name a few.-stand in the way of a challenge to the va-
lidity to 40 CER. § 124.55(b), there is a good chance that such a challenge could
ultimately find success.
INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1972,' Con-
gress aimed to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters of the United States by 1985.2 A quarter of a cen-
tury has passed since 1985, and water pollution remains a serious
problem in our modern industrialized nation." To make matters
worse, in the past decade the Supreme Court has significantly cur-
tailed efforts to control water pollution through federal
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Michigan Law School; B.A. 2006, Pennsylvania
State University. Contributing Editor, University of Michigan journal of Law Reform Volume 44.
Special thanks to Professor Neil Kagan for providing the inspiration for this Note, and for
his support and guidance throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank Lauren
Smith and Saloni Shah for their editorial contributions.
1. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (2006) (amended and renamed the Clean Water Act of 1977 and subse-
quently amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987). ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER
H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 645 (6th ed. 2009).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1).
3. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 638-43.
699
University of Michigan journal of Law Reform
implementation of the CWA. The Court's controlling opinions in
SWANCC v. Army Corps of Engineers4 and Rapanos v. United States5 suc-
cessively shrunk the federal government's jurisdiction over "the
waters of the United States."6 In each of these decisions, the Court
suggested that there are constitutional limits on the power of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps
of Engineers to require polluters to obtain permits for discharges
into intrastate waters.
With the federal government's reach over polluting entities thus
limited, it has become all the more important that the CWA pollu-
tion permits issued by EPA sufficiently protect water quality. States
play a vital role in achieving this end by certifying federal permits
through the process outlined in section 401 of the CWA.8 It is of
the utmost importance that the states are able to exercise their in-
herent "traditional and primary power over .. . water use,"9 to the
fullest extent that Congress intended,'o when certifying federal
permits. Unfortunately, an EPA regulation, 40 C.ER. § 124.55(b),
designed to bring certainty and finality to permit-holders, largely
removes state courts from the process of ensuring that state-
certified, EPA-issued permits are legally sufficient under the man-
dates of section 401. Such is the case even when state legislatures
explicitly provide for judicial review to ensure sufficiency of state
certification decisions made by state environmental agencies." This
regulation has thereby stripped States of their full capacity to con-
trol water pollution within their own borders. Secondarily, it has
nullified the ability of environmental organizations to fulfill their
quintessential function of holding governmental agencies, in this
4. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
5. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
7. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737-38; SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
9. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
10. In declaring its policy "to recognize, preserve, and prtect the primary responsibilities
and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development
and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water re-
sources," Congress chose language signaling that it was merely codifying a pre-existing right
of the States. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (emphasis added). While Rapanos and SWANCC helped to
protect the States' right to be free from federal regulation over purely intrastate matters, it is
perhaps even more important that the States retain the ability to provide for more stringent
regulation, within their borders, than a federal agency demands.
11. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (USEPA) Vessel Gen. Permit for Discharges Incidental
to the Normal Operation of Commercial Vessels, No. A08-2196, 2009 WL 2998058 (Minn.
Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2009) (refusing to reach the merits of a challenge to the Minnesota Pollu-
tion Control Agency's certification of EPA's Vessel General Permit restricting the release of
aquatic invasive species in ballast waters discharge because of 40 C.F.IL § 124.55(b) (2008)).
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case state environmental agencies, accountable to their democ-
ractically enacted directives.
This Note argues that 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) should be repealed
by EPA or invalidated by the courts, and investigates the means
available to environmental organizations to ensure that one of the
two occurs. Part I describes the statutory structure that Congress
designed in relevant provisions of the CWA. Part II argues that 40
C.F.R. § 124.55(b) dismantles an essential part of this structure,
and that the regulation is inconsistent with the CWA's text and
purpose. Part III explores the judicial and administrative obstacles
that plaintiffs must navigate to avoid the import of the regulation.
1. THE ROLE OF STATE CERTIFICATION IN THE
CLEAN WATER ACT SCHEME
A. The Purposes of the Clean Water Act
When considering the appropriate role of state certification
within the CWA's pollution prevention scheme, one must begin
with the ambitious goals that Congress announced in section
101(a) of the CWA." Congress declared its objective to "restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters" and to achieve "water quality which provides for
the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife, and
provides for recreation in and on the water."" That the discharge
of pollutants into the navigable watersl 4 was to be eliminated by
1985" suggests that Congress intended a virtually cost-blind
scheme of pollution control. The idea of eliminating all discharges
is perhaps an extreme one, but one that was nevertheless written
into the statute.' While the cost of implementing various levels of
. * 17 *
environmental protection do appear in later provisions, it is im-
portant to remember this starting point.
12. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 648.
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), (a)(2).
14. The term "navigable waters" is defined in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) as "the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas." The precise meaning of this language has been
the subject of much litigation, including in the SWANCC and Rapanos cases. See SWANCC,
531 U.S. 159; Rapanos, 541 U.S. 715.
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
16. Id.
17. See id. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (requiring point sources discharging certain pollutants to
apply the "best available technology economically achievable"); id. § 1314(b) (1) (B) (requir-
ing EPA to develop guidelines for effluent limitations while taking into account the cost of
achieving effluent reduction benefits); id. § 1316(b)(1)(B) (requiring EPA to establish
SPRING 2011] 701
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Second, despite the massive new federal regulatory structure
that it was implementing, Congress explicitly stated its goal to pre-
serve and protect the primary rights and responsibilities of States
to make the key decisions as to their own waters in section 101 (b).'
B. The Basic Structure of the Clean Water Act and Section 401
The regulatory structure that Congress put in place is a logical
outgrowth of the purposes described above. First, as a default rule,
the CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutant by any person."
A person 20 may discharge a pollutant only if compliance with the
other provisions of the CWA can be established.2 ' For the purposes
of this Note, this means that a person must obtain a National Pollu-
tant Discharge Elimination System permit (NPDES permit)
pursuant to section 402 of the CWA in order to discharge pollu-
tants. 22
Second, the provisions of sections 401 and 402 establish broad
state control over the permitting process. Under section 402(b),
States are given the opportunity to directly implement the NPDES
program within their borders, subject to a demonstration to the
EPA Administrator that the State can satisfy the requirements listed
in that section. Whatever permitting power is not absorbed by the
States through their own section 402 programs remains with the
EPA.
The States, however, also maintain final say over the adequacy of
EPA-issued section 402 NPDES permits through the certification
process established by section 401. Section 401(a) declares that
"[a] ny applicant for a Federal license or permit ... which may re-
sult in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide the
licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State in
which the discharge originates or will originate ... that any such
discharge will comply with" several provisions of the CWA, includ-
ing a state's water quality standards (WQS) adopted pursuant to
standards of performance for new sources that "take into consideration the cost of achiev-
ing ... effluent reduction").
18. Id. § 1251(b).
19. Id. § 1311(a).
20. "Person" is defined expansively to mean any "individual, corporation, partnership,
association, State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any inter-
state body." Id. § 1362(5).
21. Id. § 1311(a).
22. Id. § 1342 (establishing the NPDES permit program administered by the EPA).
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section 303. Furthermore, section 401(d) demands that "[a]ny
certification provided under this section shall set forth any effluent
limitations and other limitations ... necessary to assure that any
applicant for a Federal license or permit will comply with" several
provisions of the CWA, including a state's WQS.24
C. Water Quality Standards and Effluent Limitations in State Certification
To gain a sense of the importance of state certification in pro-
tecting water quality, it is helpful to grasp the technical meanings
of the terms "water quality standard" and "effluent limitation."
WQS consist of three components: (1) designated uses of the water
(e.g. fishing, swimming, etc.); (2) narrative or numeric criteria
necessary to protect the designated uses (e.g., no more than X
amount of pollutant Yin body of water Z); and (3) a policy limiting
the degradation of water quality (known as the antidegradation
policy).2 While EPA does set some federal WQS pursuant to sec-
tion 303, each State must establish WQS for intrastate waters at
levels necessary to protect the "public health or welfare, enhance
the quality of water and serve the purposes of [the CWA]. ,,26A State
may set WQS at levels that require more environmentally protec-
tive measures than federal standards," and a state's WQS are
particularized to individual bodies of water.18 The Supreme Court
has held that a state certification can include conditions sufficient
to assure compliance with not only numerical criteria, but also
23. Id. § 1341 (a). Section 401 also applies to the permit program operated by the Ar-
my Corps of Engineers for the disposal of dredged or fill material. See id. § 1344. For the
purposes of this Note, section 401 will be discussed only in relation to the section 402
NPDES permit program.
24. Id. § 1341(d). See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511
U.S. 700, 712-13 (1994) ("Although § 303 is not one of the statutory provisions listed in
§ 401(d), the statute allows States to impose limitations to ensure compliance with § 301 of
the Act. Section 301 in turn incorporates § 303 by reference. .. . Moreover, limitations to
assure compliance with state water-quality standards are also permitted by § 401 (d)'s refer-
ence to 'any other appropriate requirement of State law.'" (internal citation omitted)).
25. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (A); see also PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 714; 40 C.F.R.
§§ 131.3(e), 131.6 (2009); EPA, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS 1HANDBOOK § 1.2 (2d ed. 1994),
available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/handbook/chapter0l.html.
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2) (A).
27. See id. § 1370 (allowing states to adopt or enforce any pollution standard, limita-
tion, or requirement, as long as it is not less stringent than the limitations and standards
under the CWA).
28. See, e.g., MINN. R. 7050.0180 subpts. 1-2 (defining "outstanding resource value wa-
ters" and prohibiting new or expanded discharges into certain portions of latitudinally and
longitudinally identified waters, regardless of the lack of prudent or feasible alternatives).
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narrative criteria, the designated uses, and a state's antidegradation
policy.29
While WQS apply generally to entire bodies of water, effluent
limitations apply directly to dischargers, restricting the amount of a
pollutant that a permittee can discharge in a certain time period
(e.g., no more that Xpounds of pollutant Yper day)."
Effluent limitations can be either technology-based or water
quality-based. Technology-based effluent limitations (TBELs) are
based on the best practicable control technology available," or
technological feasibility for short. Water quality-based effluent limi-
tations (WQBELs), on the other hand, are based on what is
necessary to comply with WQS.32 Because section 401 requires
states to certify that a discharger will comply with WQS,33 states must
introduce WQBELs if TBELs are insufficient. In non-technical
terms, a State must impose whatever certification conditions are
necessary to guarantee a pre-established baseline of water cleanli-
ness, regardless of technological feasibility. Thus, a section 401
certification may be technology-forcing."
When the EPA proposes a "general" federal NPDES permit, the
proposed language must be broad enough to be applicable to the
entire nation. Unlike individual permits, which are written in terms
specifically tailored to individual permittees and bodies of water,
general permits are created so that all dischargers with a similar set
of characteristics can enjoy an expedited permitting process in a
defined geographic area, which can be as large as the entire na-
tion. Individual dischargers need only file a notice of intent to be
covered by the general permit to come into compliance with the
permitting requirement.3 It is in the state certification process that
29. PUDNo. 1, 511 U.S. at 714-15, 719 ("[T]he State may require that a permit appli-
cant comply with both the designated uses and the water quality criteria of the state
standards.").
30. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 652.
31. 33U.S.C.§ 1311(b)(1)(A);40C.F.R.§ 122.44(a)(1) (2009).
32. See Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1993); 40 C.ER.
§ 122.44(d) (1).
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
34. Technology-forcing regulations create market pressure for new, cleaner technology
where none would otherwise exist. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156,
209 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[A] water quality-based permit limit begins with the premise that a
certain level of water quality will be maintained, come what may, and places upon the per-
mittee the responsibility for realizing that goal.... While at first blush it seems odd to
expect dischargers to go beyond the limits of extant technology, it becomes apparent that
Congress had a deep respect for the sanctity of water quality standards and a firm conviction
of need for technology-forcing measures.").
35. See 40 CER. § 122.28 (2009).
36. Id. § 122.28(b)(2)(i).
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a broad general permit can be tailored to each state's varied WQS,
which may entail more restrictions than federal standards.
This should not be taken to imply that state certification is whol-
ly unimportant in the context of traditional individual permitting.
The State, with its greater expertise and familiarity with its local
waters, is still uniquely qualified to correct and strengthen EPA-
issued NPDES individual permits. But the stakes are raised when a
general permit is at issue, given the number of potential dis-
chargers to be covered and the need for state-specific tailoring.
Thus, the certification process is a meaningful moment in envi-
ronmental regulation, when critical conditions are added to a
permit to make it actually effective at protecting state water quality.
D. Section 401 Imposes an Obligation on the States
Not only does section 401 give States the discretion to impose
more restrictive conditions on a federal permit through its certifi-
cation process, it also imposes upon States an obligation to do so, if
necessary to protect WQS, once a State decides to certify. The text,
legislative history, and majority of case law interpreting section 401
support this conclusion.
While it is true that section 401 does give States discretion to is-
sue, deny, or waive certification, once a State chooses to certify, it
must do so in strict compliance with the mandates of section 401 (a)
and (d). This obligation is established most clearly through the use
of the word "shall" in section 401(d).'8 The certification "shall" set
forth whatever limitations are necessary to assure compliance.
Congress could have used the word "may" in place of "shall," but it
chose not to. The Senate report on the 1972 amendments to the
CWA support this reading, noting that "[t]he certification provided
by a State ... must set forth effluent limitations and monitoring
37. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, Revision of Regulations, 44
Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,880 (June 7, 1979) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 124.21-24) ("[S]ince
certification as to Federal requirements would duplicate EPA's work, EPA expects that ordi-
narily States will limit their certifications to requirements of State law."); see also Power Auth.
of N.Y. v. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 379 F. Supp. 243, 249 (N.D.N.Y 1974) (finding that
"the Congressional intent is clear that the states retain the right to set more restrictive
standards than those imposed by the Act" when attaching certification conditions to a feder-
al hydroelectric power plant permit).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) ("[A]ny certification provided under this section shallset forth
any effluent limitations and other limitations .. . necessary to assure that any applicant for a
Federal license or permit will comply with" several provisions of the CWA, including a state's
WQS. (emphasis added)).
39. Id.
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requirements necessary to comply with the provisions of this Act or
under State law. .. "
In addition, case law from several states supports the position
that section 401's requirements are obligatory. For example, the
Alaska Supreme Court has declared that subsections 401 (a) (1) and
(d) "unambiguously require states certifying draft permits to pro-
vide assurance that every NPDES permit applicant will meet state
water quality standards.",4 When the Alaska Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation failed to provide this assurance, the court
reversed and remanded the agency's decision to certify.42 The
highest courts of Virginia and Washington have similarly indicated
that section 401 imposes obligatory, not discretionary, require-
ments.43 A recent decision from a Michigan circuit court stands as
the lone exception to this string of precedents, holding instead
that states have "essentially unfettered authority" to certify as they
please." Viewed in light of the above precedents, this decision is
properly viewed as an anomoly; application for leave to appeal has
been filed in the case.
If section 401 does indeed impose a duty upon States to certify
permits in a particular manner, judicial review of state certification
decisions is necessary to enforce that obligation. Ifjudicial review is
unavailable, the obligation would be rendered meaningless.
II. 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b)
A. The Text and Practical Effect of 40 C.ER. § 124.55(b)
40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) provides:
40. S. REP. No. 92-414, at 67 (1972), rprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3735 (empha-
sis added).
41. See Miners Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 778 P.2d 1126,
1132 (Alaska 1989).
42. Id. at 1140 & n.21.
43. See Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality 541 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va.
2001) ("The federal Act requires the state § 401 certification to ensure that the proposed
activity will meet state water quality standards and applicable effluent limitations." (emphasis
added)); Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 90 P.3d 659, 675-79 (Wash. 2004)
(reviewing the sufficiency of conditions imposed in a state certification); see also Randolph L.
Hill, State Water Quality Certification of Federal NPDES Permits, 9 TUL. ENvr. L.J. 1, 16 (1995)
(explaining that section 401(d) provides the states with the responsibility to place conditions
on certifications).
44. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Chester, No. 08-1652-AA, slip op. at 5 (Mich. 30th Cir. Ct.
Dec. 17, 2010).
45. Application for Leave to Appeal, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Chester, No. 08-1652-AA
(Mich. 30th Cir. Ct.Jan. 7, 2011).
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If there is a change in the State law or regulation upon which
a certification is based, or if a court of competent jurisdiction
or appropriate State board or agency stays, vacates, or re-
mands a certification, a State which has issued a certification
under [40 C.F.R.] § 124.53 may issue a modified certification
or notice of waiver and forward it to EPA. If the modified cer-
tification is received before final agency action on the permit,
the permit shall be consistent with the more stringent condi-
tions which are based upon State law identified in such
certification. If the certification or notice of waiver is received after
final agency action on the permit, the Regional Administrator may
modify the permit on request of the permittee only to the extent neces-
sary to delete any conditions based on a condition in a certification
invalidated by a court of competent jurisdiction or by an appropriate
46State board or agency.
To evaluate the effect of 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b), one must first
consider the regulation's place within the regulatory structure that
EPA has created under the CWA. The current language of 40
C.ER. § 124.55(b) first appeared in the Federal Register in 1979,<
as a final rule originally numbered 40 C.F.R § 124.23. It has re-
mained essentially the same ever since, save for numbering
changes. The rule was promulgated through ordinary notice and
comment rulemaking procedures, as part of an extensive revision
of the regulations governing the NPDES permit program and in
response to the 1977 amendments to the CWA." Section 124.55
applies only to the EPA-operated NPDES permit program, and is
entitled "Effect of State Certification. " The proposed language
was more rigid than the final form; it called for absolutely no mod-
ification after certification, whether or not a final permit had been
issued, without exception.o
While EPA has never been forced to explain in court its justifica-
tion for promulgating 40 C.FR. § 124.55(b), the best argument for
EPA's authority relies on section 402(b) (1) (C), governing permit
modification. Section 402(b) (1) (C) first establishes that permits
"can be terminated or modified for cause." Sufficient "cause" is
46. 40 C.ER. § 124.55(b) (2009) (emphasis added).
47. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 37, at 32,930.
48. Id. at 32,854.
49. 40 C.F.R. § 124.55. Section 124.55 falls within Chapter I of Title 40, exclusively re-
lated to the EPA, and Subpart D of Part 124, entitled "Specific Procedures Applicable to
NPDES Permits."
50. For the text of the rule as initially proposed, see National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System; Revision of Existing Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 37,078, 37,115 (Aug. 21,
1978) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 124.33(c)).
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then partially defined by section 402(b) (1) (C) (i)-(iii). A permit
may be terminated or modified for cause "including, but not limited
to": (1) violating permit conditions; (2) fraudulently obtaining a
permit; or (3) a change in any condition that requires a reduction of
the permitted discharge.1 EPA has rounded out this explicitly non-
exclusive list in 40 C.F.R. § 122.62 (a), filling a gap left open by Con-
gress, an implied delegation of rulemaking power. Section
124.55(b) is incorporated into this list by way of 40 C.ER.
§ 122.62 (a) (3) (iii), which states, "[f]or changes based upon modi-
fied State certifications of NPDES permits, see § 124.55(b)." Thus
read, 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) is a regulation defining the proper
procedures for permit modification by EPA.
The first sentence of 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) allows for modifica-
tion of a permit based on "a change in the State law or regulation
upon which a certification is based, or if a court of competent ju-
risdiction or appropriate State board or agency stays, vacates, or
remands a certification."5 4 The final sentence, however, drastically
limits this allowance by placing an absolute restriction on the mod-
ification of an issued permit based on a change in a state
certification that makes the permit more stringent.55 This final sen-
tence serves to create a one-way avenue for permit modification
after permit issuance-only on request of a permittee, and only to
make a permit less environmentally protective.
Thus, in promulgating 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b), EPA has ensured
that a change in a state certification after permit issuance that
makes a permit more stringent cannot under any circumstances
constitute cause for the EPA administrator to modify a permit. Ad-
ditionally, 40 C.ER § 124.55(e) mandates that "[r]eview and
appeals of limitations and conditions attributable to State certifica-
tion shall be made through the applicable procedures of the
State." Read together, 40 C.F.R. § 124.55 mandates that judicial
review of certifications take place at the state level, and then ren-
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(C) (2006). Section 402(b), which applies to state permit
programs, is made applicable to the federal permit program through section 402(a)(3).
Thus, federal permits must adhere to the requirements of section 402(b)(1)(C), just as
state-issued permits must. See Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 574 F.2d 367, 369 n.4 (7th Cir. 1978).
52. See Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,314 (May 19, 1980)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 122.15) ("The list of causes for modifying a permit is narrow;
and absent cause from this list, the permit cannot be modified.").
53. 40 C.F.R. § 122.62(a) (S) (iii). Section 122.62 is entitled "Modification or revocation
and reissuance of permits." When the original version of § 124.55(b) was promulgated in
1979, the predecessor to § 122.62 was numbered 40 C.F.R. § 122.31. Section 122.31 did not
reference the original version of § 124.55(b), as section 122.62 does now.
54. 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) (2009).
55. See id.
56. 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(e).
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ders those proceedings a nullity, to the extent that they are under-
taken to correct an overly lenient certification after issuance. In
fact, if a state court were to accept the validity of the regulation,
any such challenge after permit issuance would arguably be ren-
dered moot, preventing any appeal from even reaching the
merits. 7
If a state court remands a certification back to the state certify-
ing agency and if the agency re-issues the certification with
additional conditions before EPA issues the certified permit, judicial
review of certifications at the state level can be effective. However,
nothing requires EPA to await the outcome of state litigation, and
EPA can-whether advertently or not-completely insulate a certi-
fication from challenges by issuing a permit immediately after an
initial certification decision, before potentially aggrieved parties
have had an opportunity to request a stay from a state court. EPA is
typically under pressure from permittees to issue permits as quickly
as possible. At the conclusion of the initial certification decision, it
is unsurprising that all parties involved are anxious for a permit to
issue in just this manner.
Additionally, case law has firmly established that EPA has no au-
thority to review the sufficiency of conditions imposed in
certifications."" If EPA cannot review state certifications, and state
courts cannot do so effectively, then state agency certification deci-
sions are unalterable acts of unbounded discretion-perhaps not
from the perspective of permittees, who are still free to challenge
overly stringent certifications, but certainly from the perspective of
environmental organizations, which are left without a remedy for a
state agency's alleged wrong. Section 124.55(b) thus helps guaran-
tee that an overly permissive permit certified by a state agency in
error will stand undisturbed for its duration, even when full com-
pliance by permittees will result in blatant water quality violations.
Agency mistakes, whether procedural or substantive in nature,
may occur for any number of reasons: a lack of time and resources,
insufficient political will, agency capture, or even simple drafting
errors. Judicial review of certification decisions is necessary to cor-
rect these mistakes, and to encourage quality agency decision
making in the first place. Only in this way can it be ensured that
state certifying agencies, and in turn, the States themselves, are ful-
filling their vital role in the CWA permitting process. In sum, 40
57. See infra Part III.B for a more in-depth treatment of the mootness issue.
58. See, e.g., Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1056 (1st
Cir. 1982).
SPRING 2011 ] 709
University of Michigan journal of Law Reform
C.F.R. § 124.55(b) is bad policy. As detailed below, it is also unlaw-
ful.
B. 40 C.ER. § 124.55(b) Conflicts with the Clean Water Act
1. Defining the Inquiry
Of course, agency action must be worse than merely misguided to
be set aside by a court. To ascertain whether 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b)
should be held unlawful by a reviewing court, it is necessary to
briefly investigate the analytical framework established by section
706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)," which establishes
the scope of judicial review of agency action. A reviewing court
might analyze the validity of the regulation under either of two
separate but related inquiries. First, there is section 706(2) (A) re-
view, which holds unlawful agency actions found to be "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."' Second, there is Chevron" review, the judicially estab-
lished inquiry that parses the requirements of section 706(2) (C),
which holds unlawful agency action found to be "in excess of statu-
tory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right."62 The now-famous two-step analysis was initially explained by
Justice Stevens in Chevron:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Con-
gress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress. . . . [I]f the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permis-
63
sible construction of the statute.
The choice between the two inquiries implicates a debate about
their respective roles that was particularly well illustrated by Judge
Edwards and Judge Wald in Arent v. Shalala.4 Judge Edwards ar-
gued that "Chevron is principally concerned with whether an agency
59. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
60. Id. § 706(2) (A).
61. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (C).
63. Chewon, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
64. 70 F.3d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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has authority to act under a statute."'5 As was the case in Arent in
the context of the Food and Drug Administration's promulgation
of voluntary labeling guidelines, there is no serious doubt that
Congress intended EPA to create rules governing permit modifica-
tion.6 Thus, perhaps the only question left to be decided is wheth-
whether EPA's exercise of its authority was arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to statute-review under section 706(2) (A).
Under Judge Edwards' conception of robust section 706(2) (A) re-
view, Chevron analysis does relatively little work in comparison.
Judge Wald had a different take: "Chevron requires a reviewing
court to ask a somewhat different question: whether an agency's
specific course of action is permitted by statute. It is possible that a
statute might grant an agency authority to act in some fashion, but
not in the particular manner it has chosen."" Utilizing Judge Wald's
reasoning, 40 C.ER. § 124.55(b) could be dealt with equally well
through Chevron review. While EPA may generally create rules on
permit modification, the specific limitation imposed in 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.55(b) is arguably not permitted by several sections of the
CWA-the result of an impermissible statutory construction under
Chevron step two." Under Judge Wald's conception of robust Chev-
ron step two review, step two carries much of the workload that
would otherwise be handled by review under section 706(2) (A). o
A third option is to include the whole inquiry within Chevron
step one. Congress, through silence or ambiguity, may have dele-
gated to EPA the authority to promulgate rules governing permit
modification, but 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) may nevertheless conflict
with several provisions of the CWA. The agency's interpretation
would still violate the clear intent of Congress in this circumstance,
and could be said to fail initially at Chevron step one.' Under this
conception of robust Chevron step one review, step one becomes
more doctrinally significant.
No matter what framework a court prefers to apply, 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.55(b) cannot not withstand judicial scrutiny. As detailed be-
low, 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) is either: (1) an exercise of legitimate
authority that is manifestly contrary to several provisions of the
65. Id. at 615 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45).
66. Id. at 616.
67. Id. at 616 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44).
68. Id. at 619 n.1 (Wald,J., concurring) (second emphasis added).
69. See id.
70. See also Whitnan v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (employing this kind
of analysis).
71. See XVILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw EXAMPLES &
EXPLANATIONs 298-99 (3d ed. 2009) (citing Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step
Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997)).
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CWA, as prohibited by section 706(2) (A); (2) an impermissible
exercise of authority under Chevron step two because of statutory
conflicts; or (3) contrary to the clear intent of Congress under
Chevron step one because of those same conflicts. Under any of
these conceptions of section 706 review, if a conflict between the
regulation and the statute is established, the regulation is unlawful
and must be set aside. Part II.B.2 undertakes to establish such a
conflict.
2. Detailing the Statutory Conflict
As discussed in Part II.A, section 402(b) (1) (C) of the CWA does
seemingly confer (or is at least sufficiently ambiguous about con-
ferring) on EPA the authority to elaborate on what constitutes
"cause" for permit modification. But, importantly, this implied del-
egation did not give EPA a license to define "cause" in any way that
it desires. However defined, EPA could not restrict the "for cause"
requirement so severely that it conflicts with other provisions of the
CWA, or else the regulation would fail under Chevron step one,
Chevron step two, or section 706(2) (A) review. Sections 101(b),
401(a) (1), and 401(d) present such a conflict. They indicate that
when a state court decides that a certification is insufficient to pro-
tect state WQS, EPA must respect the State's ultimate decision and
modify the permit accordingly. The perceived advantages of enact-
ing the regulation are insufficient to cure these statutory conflicts.
a. 40 C.ER. § 124.55(b) Conflicts with Sections 101(b), 401(a)(1),
and 401(d) of the Clean Water Act
Section 401(d) of the CWA requires that "[a] ny certification ...
shall set forth any ... limitations ... necessary to assure that any ap-
plicant ... will comply with [sections 301, 302, 306, and 307 of the
CWA] and with any other appropriate requirement of State law
[including state WQS] set forth in such certification, and shall be-
come a condition on any Federal license or permit.",2 Two separate
ideas are expressed in this language. First, States are obligated to
issue sufficiently protective certifications, as indicated by the words
"shall set forth." This is the idea explored above in Part I.D. As
noted in that discussion, section 401(d) contemplates state judicial
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
73. See id.
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review of certification decisions, so that the States' obligations are
meaningful. Second, that these limitations "shall become a condi-
tion" on a permit demonstrates that EPA must incorporate all
conditions that a State deems necessary to protect its own waters.
There is no ambiguity in deciphering the intent of Congress in
drafting section 401 (d)--certifications must protect state water
quality, and EPA must defer to States on this matter.
This reading of section 401(d) is in line with Congress's express
policy in section 101 (b) "to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution. 7 5
Section 401(a) (1) is likewise explicit in putting states in control
of the certification process. It establishes that the State has the au-
thority to certify, the State has the authority to deny certification,
and the federal permit depends upon the State's grant of a certifi-
cation that meets the requirements of section 401 .
The CWA, however, says nothing at all about the authority of
state agencies. Nor could it, because the federal government may
not directly regulate a state's administrative procedures, as defined
by state legislatures. State administrative bodies have only the au-
thority that they are granted by their state legislatures. It is up to
the States to decide how to certify NPDES permits, and including
judicial review of agency certification decisions is an eminently rea-
sonable way for States to fulfill their obligations under section 401.
Most states do provide for such review, some through procedures
specifically tailored to the state certification process, others
through the normal procedures by which state agency actions are
challengeable.79 Therefore, any decision by an authorized state
court must be respected as part of the authoritative determination
of the State.
EPA might point to alternative language in section 401(a) (1) as
an independent basis of authority for the promulgation of 40
74. See id.
75. See id. § 1251(b).
76. Id. § 1341(a) (1) ("Any applicant for a federal license or permit ... shall provide
the licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State .... Such State ... shall estab-
lish procedures for public notice in the case of all applications for certifications by it. . . and
for public hearings in connection with specific applications.... No license or permit shall
be granted if certification has been denied by the State." (emphasis added)).
77. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997) ("[Sltate legislatures are not
subject to federal direction.").
78. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 115.05 (2009) (providing for judicial review of Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency final decisions pertaining to certifications).
79. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 28; MIcH. COMP. LAws § 600.631 (2010) (provid-
ing for judicial review of agency action not otherwise provided for).
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C.F.R. § 124.55(b), or at least to rebut the claim that this section
conflicts with its interpretation of section 402(b) (1) (C). Section
401 (a) (1) states: "If the State ... fails or refuses to act on a request
for certification, within a reasonable period of time (which shall
not exceed one year) after receipt of such request, the certification
requirements of this subsection shall be waived with respect to such
Federal application."80 This language signals congressional intent
that state certification be undertaken quickly and efficiently, that a
State can lose its certification rights if it unreasonably delays in is-
suing a certification, and that there are limits to a State's power
under section 401.
This sentence should not be construed, however, to preclude ju-
dicial review of a timely certification decision. In rejecting a
permittee's argument that a certification was not final because of a
state agency's subsequent attempt to reconsider the certification,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated, "where . . .
the agency itself ... has spoken and has explicitly labeled its action
'final,' we think that is enough [to consider the action final], even
though the agency may choose to reconsider or may be reversed on
judicial review."8 1 In light of the language of sections 401(d) and
101(b), section 401 (a) (1) is best read as requiring EPA to treat
state agency certification decisions as final but reviewable. Under
this interpretation, EPA may issue permits in reliance upon state
agency certifications, but may not treat post-issuance alterations
stemming from judicial review as implied waivers by unreasonable
delay.
Because 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) denies the effect of a state court's
remand and subsequent certification by a state agency, it conflicts
with the language of section 401(d), in that permit terms settled
on by a State would not become part of a final permit. It conflicts
with section 401 (a) (1), because it takes from States a portion of
their authority to grant or deny certification. And it conflicts with
section 101(b) in that it wrests from States their long-established
responsibility and right to protect their own waters. These conflicts
with the CWA render the regulation unlawful.
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
81. P.R. Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 80-81 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis added) (re-
manding an NPDES permit to EPA on alternative grounds).
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b. The Interest in Certainty and Finality
EPA may argue that sections 402(b) (1) (B) 2 and 402(k)83 of the
CWA indicate an emphasis on regularity in permit issuance and
finality in permit terms justified the promulgation of 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.55(b). EPA seemed to have these interests in mind when it
declared the promulgation of 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) "necessary to
avoid a 'moving target' of State law during the permit's life.""'
While EPA's concern with certainty and finality in permitting is in-
deed justified, any interpretation of the two above-mentioned
provisions that would grant EPA the ability to deny the effective-
ness of state judicial review does not withstand careful scrutiny.
Section 402(k) states, in relevant part, that "[c] ompliance with a
permit issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed compliance,
for purposes of sections [309 and 505 of the CWA], with sections
1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, and 1343 of this title."8  This section is in-
tended to exculpate permittees who are in compliance with the
terms of their permits from enforcement actions under sections
309 and 505, even if the permit is not sufficiently protective of wa-
ter quality. EPA, however, has already acknowledged that any
protection section 402(k) may provide to permittees who are com-
plying with the terms of their permits is expressly limited by section
402(b) (1) (C), which provides an avenue for permit modification
"for cause. Thus, section 402(k) provides EPA with no guidance
on how to define the "for cause" requirement for permit modifica-
tion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
confirmed EPA's initial reading of 402(k), holding that "[section]
402(k) does not purport to address the question of permit modifi-
cation. Its concern is what constitutes compliance with the Act for
the purpose of an enforcement proceeding brought under [sec-
tion] 309 or [section] 505."8"
Similarly, the text of section 402(b) (1) (B) does not provide EPA
with the authority to promulgate section 124.55(b). Section
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b) (1) (B).
83. Id. § 1342(k).
84. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 37, at 32,867 (dis-
cussing the concept of finality as expressed in section 402(k)); id. at 32,879 (emphasizing
that departures from the five-year cycle of permit issuance and reexamination laid down by
section 402(b)(1)(B) should not be encouraged).
85. Id. at 32,880.
86. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k).
87. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 37, at 32,867.
88. Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 574 F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1978) ("There is nothing in the
legislative history to indicate that § 402(k) was intended to prohibit modification of a permit
to bring it into conformity with a different or more stringent standard.").
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402(b) (1) (B) emphasizes that NPDES permits must be "for fixed
terms not exceeding five years."89 This section merely speaks to the
fixed duration of NPDES permits-the length of time that a legally
sufficient permit is in effect cannot be unexpectedly shortened to
the detriment of a permittee. Section 124.55(b), however, does
nothing to protect a permit's fixed term; any permit modification
that 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) prevents would merely alter a permit's
content, not its duration. Instead, 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) helps en-
sure that legally defective permits remain defective for their
duration. Furthermore, Congress explicitly provided for permit
termination or revocation when circumstances warrant such ac-
tion.o
Taken together, sections 402(b) (1) (B) and (k) merely help to
define a permit's parameters, and a permittee's rights flowing from
compliance with a permit, while the permit's terms remain in effect. Nei-
ther provides EPA with any assistance in defining the circumstances
that justify modifying or terminating those terms, let alone the spe-
cific advice to prohibit permit modification based on state-court
induced changes to certifications.
In sum, the underlying interest in certainty and finality implicit
in sections 402(b) (1) (B) and (k) falls short of providing EPA with
a statutory directive that creates conflict with the language of sec-
tions 101(b), 401(a)(1), and 401(d), so as to justify the
promulgation of 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b). EPA might have alternative
rationales for the promulgation of the regulation, but none are
readily apparent from the record available.9' So while EPA may for
policy reasons prefer that certifications be insulated from judicial
review, it has no statutory basis for imposing such a regime on the
states.
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1) (B).
90. See, e.g., id. § 1341 (a) (5) (stating that any state-certified federal permit may be re-
voked by the issuing federal agency upon entering of a judgment that the activity has been
operated in violation of §§ 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, or 1317); id. § 1342(b) (1) (C) (allowing a
permit to be terminated for cause).
91. When initially promulgating the regulation, EPA seemed to suggest there might be
some due process concerns with applying permit conditions that were not in effect at the
time of permit issuance. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 37,
at 32,880 (referencing a due process discussion at 32,886-87). This suggestion misses the
mark for two reasons. First, EPA's subsequent discussion of due process regards the applica-
tion of generally applicable regulations promulgated after permit issuance, not conditions specific
to a permit that are added because of statutory insufficiency. Id. at 32,8867. Second, EPA neects
this due process argument in that very discussion for the same reason it should be rejected
here-the permittee has an opportunity to argue the sufficiency of the certification in court.
Id.
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III: GETTING RID OF 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b)
If the goal is to ensure that NPDES permits reflect certification
decisions that comport with the CWA, then establishing the invalid-
ity of 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b), in the abstract, is but one step toward
ultimate success. The remainder of this Note will attempt to identi-
fy a path for aggrieved environmental organizations to successfully
challenge 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b), and in turn, the legality of certifi-
cations. This task requires an investigation into the availability of
judicial review of administrative action and the division of labor
between state and federal courts.
This Part concludes that there are two possible avenues for envi-
ronmental groups to attack 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b). The first, and
most straightforward, requires a petition to EPA to repeal the rule.
There is a possibility (however remote) that EPA would simply
agree. If EPA rejects the petition, this refusal to repeal could po-
tentially serve as the basis for a challenge to the regulation's
substantive validity in federal court. However, standing would re-
main a significant hurdle to obtaining relief.
The second avenue stems from an initial state-court challenge to
a defective certification. If a state court decides to invalidate 40
C.F.R. § 124.55(b) within its jurisdiction, a subsequent legal battle
may ensue with EPA over the legal effect of the state-court deci-
sion. If this is the case, then EPA's application of 40 C.ER.
§ 124.55(b) could serve as the basis for an as-applied challenge to
the regulation in federal court. If the state court decides that the
regulation moots the appeal, then this state court's application of
40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) to the plaintiffs might serve a similar func-
tion.
A. Petition EPA to Repeal 40 C.ER. § 124.55(b)
The first and most obvious way to advocate for the repeal of an
administrative rule is to petition the promulgating agency. The
APA explicitly provides this avenue of relief to any "interested per-
son," which includes organizations representing the concerns of
their members."
There is at least a possibility that EPA would find that the peti-
tion has merit, deciding that its prior rulemaking did indeed
conflict with the CWA, and that the conflict was merely not appre-
ciated when it promulgated 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b). If this were the
92. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006); 2AM.JuR. 2d Administrative Law § 218 (2010).
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case the repeal of the rule would still need to comply with the re-
quired APA process for notice and comment rulemaking. 3 The
repeal would be open to judicial challenges from industry groups
that currently enjoy the unilateral benefits that the rule provides.
If EPA denies the petition, the exercise would still be a valuable
one for the petitioners. The denial might help to supply the peti-
tioners access to the federal courts. Ordinarily, challenges to the
validity of the regulation would be time-barred by the generally
applicable six-year statute of limitations on civil actions against the
United States. 4 EPA's rejection of the petition, however, would re-
new the ripeness of the petitioners' claim that the rule is
substantively defective, because EPA's rejection of the petition
would constitute reviewable "agency action" under the APA.5 By
relying on, and implicitly reaffirming the lawfulness of, the rule in
question, EPA would expose itself to legal challenges alleging that
the rule conflicts with the CWA and is therefore invalid. 6
This denial would be reviewed under the standard laid out in
the APA at 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A), whereby agency action found to
be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
97
accordance with law" is set aside. If the reviewing court agrees
that the regulation conflicts with the CWA, EPA's decision to not
repeal could be struck down under any one of these criteria, "for
agencies have an everpresent duty to insure that their actions are
lawful."98 The "otherwise not in accordance with law" prong,
though, would capture the essence of EPA's potential wrongdoing
particularly well because the decision to keep 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b)
93. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (defining "rule making" as an "agency process of formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule" (emphasis added)); Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139
F.3d 914, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Once a rule is final, an agency can amend it only through a
new rulemaking.").
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2006) ("Except as provided by the Contract Disputes Act
of 1978, every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the
complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues."); see, e.g., Elk Grove
v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[A] number of cases hold that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2401 (a) . . . applies to suits under the Administrative Procedure Act.").
95. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (stating that "final agency action for which there is no other ad-
equate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review"); id. § 551 (defining agency action
as including "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act").
96. See Pub. Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 901 F.2d 147, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
("[A] claim that [an] agency action was violative of statute may be raised outside a statutory
limitations period, by filing a petition for amendment or rescission of the agency's regula-
tions, and challenging the denial of that petition."); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v.
EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1472-73 (11th Cir. 1997).
97. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A); see, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 738 F.2d 97, 99-100 (3d.
Cir. 1984) (reviewing the EPA administrator's denial of a petition for rulemaking under the
standard of § 706(2) (A)).
98. Pub. Citizen, 901 F.2d at 152.
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in place would not be in accordance with the sections of the CWA
that the rule violates.
Overcoming the statute of limitations is an important step to-
wards invalidating 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b), but by no means the only
one. In order to challenge the validity of the regulation, the peti-
tioners would still need to establish standing." Standing doctrine
requires that the regulation cause the petitioners some particular-
ized injury that can be effectively redressed by the judicial relief
sought. 00 In order to find potential plaintiffs who have suffered
such an injury, one must look to the state courts.
B. State Court Challenge to a Certification
It is well established that state courts are the appropriate forums
for challenges to state certifications under section 401 of the CWA,
despite the fact that review of certification decisions might involve
federal questions."o" Generally speaking, this helps to protect the
states' role as the primary guardian of their own water quality, and
prevents federal courts and agencies from second-guessing the
wisdom of state certification decisions. In this respect, it is a tradi-
tion that is not in the best interest of environmental organizations
to challenge.
It does, however pose a unique problem to these organizations
when they would like to challenge the sufficiency of certifications
of NPDES permits. If EPA has issued a permit after a state agency's
initial certification, any subsequent action by a state agency in re-
sponse to a state-court decision would ultimately be rejected by
EPA as an improper ground for permit modification; this renders
the challenge to the certification moot. Therefore, 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.55(b) must be invalidated in the course of the state-court
proceeding for a certification challenge to have any success.
99. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (stating the consti-
tutionally required elements of standing).
100. Id.
101. See 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(e) (2009) ("[A]ppeals ... attributable to State certification
shall be made through the applicable procedures of the State."); Roosevelt Campobello Int'l
Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1056 (1st Cir. 1982); Lisa M. Bogardus, State Certification
of Hydroelectric Facilities Under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 89-90
(1992); Hill, supra note 43, at 28.
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1. State CourtJurisdiction to Invalidate 40 C.ER. § 124.55(b)
While state courts may not be the most natural setting for a chal-
lenge to a federal rule, existing precedent, explored in this Part,
indicates that it is within the jurisdiction of state courts to invali-
date 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) within their territories.
The starting point of the jurisdictional analysis begins with the
presumption that state courts have inherent authority to adjudicate
claims arising under federal law.102 This presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction can be rebutted only by (1) "an explicit statutory di-
rective," (2) "by unmistakable implication from legislative history,"
or (3) "by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction
and federal interests.,103 Part III.B.1.a reveals that state courts have
not been broadly divested of their jurisdiction to pass on the validi-
ty of federal regulations. Part III.B.1.b establishes that section 509
of the CWA has not stripped state courts of their authority to inval-
idate 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b).
a. State Courts Retain Their Authority to
Invalidate Federal Regulations
There has been no broad divestment-either statutorily through
the APA or by clear incompatibility with federal interests-of state-
court authority to determine whether federal regulations conflict
with federal statutes. In The Michigan Department of Environmen-
tal Quality, in National Wildlife Federation v. Chester, suggested that
the APA requires judicial review of an EPA regulation in federal
court.10 A textual analysis of the APA suggests otherwise.
Section 702 declares that persons suffering legal wrong because of
agency action are entitled to judicial review, and that certain actions
in federal court shall not be dismissed on the ground that they are
against the United States, or that the United States is an indispensa-
ble party.'05 While this provision does establish the general
reviewability of agency action in federal courts, it does not speak to
the state courts' jurisdiction to review federal agency action. Like-
wise, section 703 establishes that when no special statutory-review
102. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (holding that "state courts have inherent
authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws
of the United States").
103. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981).
104. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 16-17, Nat'I Wildlife Fed'n v. Chester, No. 08-
1652-AA (Mich. 30th Cir. Ct. June 29, 2009).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
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proceedings are created by statute, judicial review may be had in
any court of competent jurisdiction.'06 But this provision says noth-
ing about which courts have such jurisdiction. In short, the APA
does not speak to the question of whether state courts have juris-
diction to invalidate federal regulations.
Similarly, there is no clear incompatibility between state-court
jurisdiction and federal interests when determining a federal regu-
lation's validity. While there is a federal interest in uniform
interpretation of federal law, this interest has no particular im-
portance here. In a close parallel, the federal courts of appeal
routinely disagree on matters of statutory interpretation, requiring
federal agencies to adjust their implementation of regulatory re-
gimes in different geographic regions in appropriate circumstanc-
circumstances;' an identical system would work equally well if
state courts disagreed. If the U.S. Supreme Court decides that the
implicated CWA provisions are particularly in need of uniform in-
terpretation, it can supply it, because even state courts must accept
the construction that the Supreme Court gives to federal statutes.0 s
Additionally, there is a counterbalancing federal interest that is
implicated here-state-court jurisdiction to rule on the validity of
federal regulations will sometimes allow for the vindication of fed-
eral rights violated by state or local officials acting under color of
state law.'09 This is precisely the scenario that invalidation of 40
C.F.R. § 124.55(b) presents because the regulation would otherwise
prevent aggrieved citizens from bringing suit against state envi-
ronmental agencies that have violated the certification
requirements of section 401 of the CWA.
Upon reflection, it should be no surprise that state courts are
generally competent to invalidate federal regulations operating
within their territories. Phrased differently, a state court would
merely be enforcing the superior authority-the federal Clean
Water Act-rather than an inconsistent regulation, a result
106. Id. § 703 (2006).
107. See Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The separation of powers
doctrine requires administrative agencies to follow the law of the circuit whose courts have
jurisdiction over the cause of action. In the absence of a controlling decision by the Su-
preme Court, the respective courts of appeals express the law of the circuit."); Thomas v.
N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 478 S.E.2d 816, 824 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996), affd 485 S.E.2d 295
(N.C. 1997); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 753-65 (1989) (discussing the circumstances under which it is
appropriate for federal agencies to disregard the precedents of the federal courts of ap-
peals).
108. See United States v. Gilbert Assoc., 345 U.S. 361, 363 (1953); Elmendorf v. Taylor,
23 U.S. 152, 160 (1825).
109. Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2114 (2009).
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demanded by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution."o
Confirming this interpretation, at least one state court has invali-
dated a federal regulation that conflicted with a federal statute."
Other state courts have suggested that they would do the same if
presented with a clear conflict."' No precedent can be found that
suggests otherwise.
The legal community has paid surprisingly little attention to the
question of whether a state court can invalidate a federal regula-
tion. At first glance, this issue seems both important and basic-the
type of legal question destined to be answered in casebooks on the
federal courts or administrative law. It has, however, seemingly
slipped through the cracks until this point, going almost entirely
untested in courts and law review articles. This is probably because,
in most imaginable situations, there is little in the way of a discern-
ible advantage to challenging a federal regulation in state court,
given the geographically limited scope of the judgment that such a
court is able to render. This calculus is altered here, however, be-
cause a state court is the only forum where a challenge to 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.55(b) can be initiated. Such a situation arises here only be-
110. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (" [T]he laws of the United States ... shall be the su-
preme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby. . . .")
111. See Anderson v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 428 S.E.2d 267, 269-70 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993); Thomas, 478 S.E.2d at 823-24. In Anderson, the North Carolina Court of Appeals inval-
idated a U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulation that conflicted with the federal
Food Stamp Act. 428 S.E.2d at 269-70. In Thomas, the same court reaffirmed its decision in
Anderson and was subsequently affirmed by the state Supreme Court, holding that it had
"acted within its authority in interpreting the Food Stamp Act and consequently invalidating
the USDA's conflicting regulation." 478 S.E.2d at 824. In support of this holding, the court
noted the discussion of concurrent jurisdiction in Tafflin and the lack of any evidence that
Congress had divested state courts of jurisdiction. Id. (discussing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S.
455, 458 (1990)).
112. See State Treasurer v. Abbott, 660 N.W.2d 714, 718 (Mich. 2003) (holding that
"[w]here a federal statute clearly addresses the issue at hand, we apply the statute as writ-
ten," and not a federal agency's inconsistent interpretation of the statute) (applying
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). In Abbott, the
court applied federal Treasury regulations containing reasonable definitions of terms that
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000), did
not define. 660 N.W.2d at 718. But the decision signals that the court would have applied
the statute, and not the regulation, had ERISA been clear or the Treasury's interpretation
unreasonable. See id. at 717-18, 722-23.
Additionally, a recent Michigan circuit court decision directly addressed this issue, albeit
in dicta, in a case involving a challenge to a certification and 40 C.ER. § 124.55(b). See Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n v. Chester, No. 08-1652-AA, slip op. at 8-9 (Mich. 30th Cir. Ct. Dec. 17, 2010).
The court stated that it did "not agree ... that [section 124.55(b)] or some other federal
rule may not be challenged here . . . ." Id. However, this language was not controlling; there
was no need to reach the issue after the court found the certification at issue legally suffi-
cient. Id. at 9. And as previously noted, application for leave to appeal has been filed in this
case, and the decision's precedential value is in question. See supra text accompanying note
44.
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cause of the uniqueness of the federal-state relationship created by
the CWA scheme under sections 401 and 402 and their implement-
ing regulations. To successfully challenge a section 401
certification in state court, 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) must be invalidat-
ed. But to invalidate 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b), the challengers need
standing,"'3 and standing cannot be achieved until the regulation
threatens to disrupt the proceedings or decision of a state court.
b. Section 509 of the CWA Has Not Divested State Courts of Their
Jurisdiction to Invalidate 40 C.ER. § 124.55(b)
An analysis of section 509 of the CWA"'4 suggests that Congress
did not specifically strip state courts of their authority to invalidate
a more narrow category of regulations similar to 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.55(b). Section 509 establishes special procedures for review
of specific actions taken by the EPA administrator pursuant to the
CWA." 5 Specifically, section 509(b) (1) states that review of the
Administrator's action in discharging various responsibilities may
be had in the pertinent federal circuit court of appeals, provided
that such appeal be taken within 120 days of the Administrator's
action, or after that date only if the appeal is based solely on
grounds that arose after the 120th day.16
Even if the Administrator's promulgation of 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.55(b) falls within one of the categories of activities listed in
section 509(b) (1) (a point taken up in the next paragraph), Con-
gress's choice of the word "may" indicates that state courts have not
been divested of their concurrent jurisdiction."' "This grant of
federal jurisdiction is plainly permissive, not mandatory . .. . In-
deed, '[i] t is black letter law . . . that the mere grant of jurisdiction
to a federal court does not operate to oust a state court from con-
current jurisdiction over the cause of action.' ""' Hence, section
509 merely addresses the division of labor amongst the federal
courts. When an interested party would like to challenge an action
included within the language of section 509(b) (1) (A)-(G), re-
course must be had to the special procedures described, but only if
the challenge is being made in federal court.
113. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (2006).
115. See id.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. See id.
118. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 460-61 (1990) (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981)).
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Assuming arguendo that section 509 does divest state courts ofju-
risdiction over the disputes governed by that section, the
promulgation of 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) most likely does not fall into
any of the categories listed in section 509(b) (1) (A)-(G). These
categories include:
Review of the Administrator's action (A) in promulgating any
standard of performance under section 1316 of this title, (B)
in making any determination pursuant to section
1316(b) (1) (C) of this title, (C) in promulgating any effluent
standard, prohibition, or pretreatment standard under sec-
tion 1317 of this title, (D) in making any determination as to a
State permit program submitted under section 1342(b) of this
title, (E) in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation
or other limitation under section 1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345 of
this title, (F) in issuing or denying any permit under section
1342 of this tide, and (G) in promulgating any individual con-
trol strategy under section 1314(1) of this title .... .
There is some precedent expressing the notion that subsection
(F), which governs review of the issuance or denial of any permit
under section 402, also encompasses review of the rules governing
the issuance of permits and regulating the underlying permitting
procedures.120 Taking this proposition as established, it is far from
clear that 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) qualifies as such a regulation. Tak-
ing a cue from its title, 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) governs the "Effect of
State certification" on modification of already issued permits.12'
Additionally, the "perverse situation" to which the Supreme Court
referred to in E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,22 where a fed-
eral court of appeals would be forced to review the grants or
denials of specific permits without being able to scrutinize the reg-
119. 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1).
120. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that EPA storm water discharge regulations which exempted some activities from
immediate NPDES permitting requirements were within the purview of section
509(b)(1)(F)); Nat'l Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 933 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1992)) (holding that rules exempting
pesticides from NPDES permitting requirements were within purview of section
509(b)(1)(F)). But see League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1190 n.8
(9th Cir. 2002) (counseling against the expansive application of section 509(b)); Envtl. Pro-
tection Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding
that an EPA rule was "properly characterized as a regulation identifying a class of silvicultur-
al sources that do not require NPDES permits," and was thus not within the purview of
section 509(b) (1) (F)).
121. 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) (2009).
122. 430 U.S. 112, 136 (1977).
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ulations governing those actions, is not implicated with respect to
§ 124.55(b); the circuit courts are not the appropriate forums for
disputes over state certifications, nor for permit modifications, the
actions in which the validity of 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) is likely to
.123
arise.
2. State Courts Can Invalidate 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b)
A challenge to the validity of 40 C.ER. § 124.55(b) satisfies all of
the requisite threshold inquiries that might otherwise prevent a
court from reviewing an administrative decision on the merits. After
refuting the possible bases for statutory divestment, it is safe to con-
clude that state courts retain their concurrent jurisdiction to invali-
invalidate the regulation within their respective territories.2 4 The
presumption that agency action is reviewable in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary, established in Abbott Labor-
atories from the language of sections 702 and 704 of the APA,
indicates that EPA's promulgation 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) is reviewa-
ble. 25 Lastly, any potentially applicable statutes of limitations should
not bar state judicial review of the regulation in the course of a chal-
lenge to a state certification. Because section 509's requirements do
not apply to our challenge, there is no need to worry about its re-
quirement that a challenge to a regulation occur within 120 days of
issuance. Neither does the six-year limitation of 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (a)
apply, because the action would not be brought against the federal
government, but rather against the state agency that issued the certi-
fication.2
Thus, the state courts should be free to examine 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.55(b)'s consistency with the CWA. An interesting question is
whether the state courts should review the federal regulation pur-
suant to the federal APA or to their own versions of the APA, which
carry their own unique interpretive glosses. While a federal agency
123. Section 509(b) (1) (F) could be read expansively to encompass actions related to
permit modifications, in addition to issuances and denials. If that is the case, then permit
modification disputes should be handled by the federal courts of appeals, and there would
be a stronger case to be made that a challenge to 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) should likewise fall
within the terms of section 509(b) (1) (F).
124. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981).
125. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967).
126. Additionally, an attempt by a state agency to introduce 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) into
the litigation probably amounts to an application of the regulation to the plaintiffs. This
application, by itself, should allow plaintiffs to work around any potentially applicable stat-
ute of limitations. An analogous point is taken up in greater detail infra Part III.B.2.b, in
reference to a state court's potential application.
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promulgated the regulation pursuant to federal APA standards, a
state court conducting the review might be inclined to review the
agency action pursuant to its state's own APA-like judicial-review
provisions. While the state court inquiries into the legality of fed-
eral agency action are similar in nature to the inquiry employed
by the federal courts pursuant to the federal APA (which, as
explained supra Part II.B, has itself been subject to different
applications by the federal courts), they differ in the details.
Notably, a number of state courts employ a version of the Chevron
test that gives less deference to agency interpretation, making it
more likely that a 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) would be adjudged to be
inconsistent with the CWA. 27
Thus, there is at least a possibility that challenges to certification
decisions can be successful in state court. A state court could rea-
sonably find in favor of the plaintiffs on both the threshold issues
and the substantive validity of 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b). At that point,
the state court could investigate the procedural and substantive
adequacy of the certification. But as detailed in the following
section, there are more legal obstacles to overcome following a
state-court judgment.
3. Possible Paths for Litigation After State Court Ruling
How a state court rules on the validity of 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) is
a crossroads that will decide the direction in which litigation pro-
ceeds. This section attempts to envision a few of the key issues and
127. See Michael Pappas, No Two Stepping in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards and
Their Implications for Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39 McGEORGE L. REv. 977, 985-86
(2008). Pappas groups the states into four broad categories that roughly approximate their
announced standards of review. Id. States in at least two of those groupings apply standards
of review that are in theory less deferential than Chevron. States in the least deferential cate-
gory, "de novo with deference discouraged," include Delaware, Nebraska, New York,
Oklahoma, and Virginia. Id. at 986 n.32. The second less deferential category, "de novo with
the possibility of deference to agency expertise or experience," includes Alaska, California,
Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Utah, and Washington. Id at
1010-23. A third category of states applies "intermediate deference" often explicitly assert-
ing the authority to review matters of law de novo while choosing instead to apply deference,
which Pappas interprets to be most consistent with the current federal application of Chev-
ron. Id. at 985. States in this category include Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin. Id. at 985 n.29. Pappas
characterizes the final category, "strong deference," as composed of states that mandatorily
defer to agency interpretations that are not contrary to statute, which Pappas claims is most
consistent with the announced Chevron two-step. Id. at 985. These states are Alabama, Con-
necticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at 985
n.28.
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disputes that might arise in such litigation, in order to gauge the
ability of environmental groups to avoid the effect of the regula-
tion.
a. State Court Invalidates 40 C.ER. § 124.55(b)
If a state court agrees on both its jurisdiction to invalidate 40
C.F.R. § 124.55(b) and this regulation's substantive invalidity, the
court might set aside 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b), reach the merits of the
challenge to the certification, and remand the certification back to
the state certifying agency with an order to modify in accordance
with the requirements of the CWA. What happens after this de-
pends on the actions of the parties involved.
As a preliminary matter, the state agency would have to comply
with the state court's decision to correct the certification. If it re-
fused to comply, the agency could be held in contempt.128
When the state agency forwards the modified certification to
EPA, EPA might relent and simply choose to modify the permit to
incorporate the new conditions. This decision could then be chal-
lenged by the permittee,129 but if the challenge fails, the permit
would be modified in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 124.5(c) (1), and
40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) would remain invalidated in one state out of
fifty.
Alternatively, EPA might refuse to modify the permit, in an at-
tempt to rely on 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b), which, never having been
repealed by EPA or adjudged invalid by a federal court, would re-
main on the books throughout most of the nation. If EPA refuses
to modify the permit, the denial must first be informally appealed
to the Environmental Appeals Board; this step constitutes an ad-
ministrative remedy that must be exhausted before access to the
courts may be had.30 Nothing in the language of the regulation
establishing the informal appeal process seems to require that the
appeal come from the same entity that requested the modifica-
tion-in this case, the State. If the informal appeal is
128. See United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 293-94 (1947); 17
C.J.S. Contempt § 23 (2011). Of course, the state agency could attempt to appeal the state
court decision within the state judicial system.
129. If the permit at issue is a general permit, and if no individual applications have yet
been processed, there would be no permittee to challenge the agency action. If an individu-
al permit is at issue, or if permittees have already been authorized to discharge under a
general permit, the permittees should have standing to challenge the EPA action.
130. See40 C.F.R. § 124.5(b) (2009).
131. See id. (stating that "[dienials by the Regional Administrator may be informally ap-
pealed to the Environmental Appeals Board by a letter briefly setting forth the relevant
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unsuccessful, the environmental organization that brings the in-
formal appeal could bring an action against EPA seeking injunctive
relief. Because the action is being brought against EPA, and in-
volves federal, not state, questions, the suit would likely end up in
federal court.' 2 EPA's action in refusing to modify the permit likely
falls outside the categories of actions listed in section
509(b) (1) (A)-(G). Thus, the suit would be brought in federal dis-
trict court.'
The outcome of the action might turn on whether the state
court's interpretation of the CWA binds EPA with regard to the
certification at issue. In answering this question it is important to
pin down exactly what the state court has held. In invalidating 40
C.F.R. § 124.55(b), not only does the state court remove the abso-
lute bar to permit modification that the regulation imposes on
EPA, it does so because EPA shall include the State's final determi-
nations as part of the permit, pursuant to section 401(d) of the
CWA.m Thus, if the state court decision binds EPA, EPA must in-
corporate the new conditions and modify the permit.
A federal agency must comply with a decision rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, when that agency was a party to
the suit in which the decision was rendered.3 5 The situation is
more complicated here, where EPA was not a party to the state-
court action that invalidated its regulation.
facts," without noting who may bring such an appeal). Additionally, 40 C.F.R. § 124.5(a)
states that "any interested person" may request a modification, suggesting the possibility that
an environmental organization could itself request the modification. 40 C.ER. § 124.5 (a).
132. The environmental organization may believe there is an advantage to bringing the
challenge in the state court that rendered the initially favorable decision. However, such an
organization would have a countervailing interest in having a federal court rule on the issue
of the validity of 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b); a federal court's invalidation could potentially have
broader geographic applicability than that of a state court. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra
note 107, at 717 (noting EPA's general policy of eschewing relitigation of an issue that has
been decided against it in any circuit). The exact balance of these interests turns on the
specifics of the case. In addition, EPA could successfully remove the action to federal court,
if it so desired. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (2006) ("A civil action ... commenced in a State
court against any of the following may be removed by them to the district court of the Unit-
ed States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: (1) The
United States or any agency thereof. . . ."). The remainder of this discussion assumes a party
removed the action to federal court.
133. See supra note 123 for a caveat. If permit modification is an action included in sec-
tion 509(b)(1)(F), the action would need to be brought in the pertinent federal court of
appeals. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1) (2006).
134. See id. § 1341(d).
135. See Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1986); Thomas v. N.C. Dep't of
Human Res., 478 S.E.2d 816, 822-23 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996), affd 485 S.E.2d 295 (N.C. 1997);
Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 107 at n.1 ("Agencies have accepted, of course, the authority
of the lower federal courts to enter rulings that are binding resolutions of the particular
dispute between the parties before the court.").
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To determine if EPA is bound, it is helpful to determine whether
the federal court is bound by the state court decision in this scenar-
io. If the federal court is bound, then it must force EPA to modify
the permit by granting injunctive relief. In most circumstances,
federal courts are not bound by state-court interpretations of fed-
eral law in their districts.16 But in the action envisioned, the federal
court would not merely be interpreting the CWA in some unrelat-
ed case. The court would be dealing with the same core set of facts
that was already authoritatively handled by the state court. This
raises the possibility of issue preclusion and collateral estoppel. "It
is ... settled that a federal court must give to a state-court judg-
ment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment
under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered."1 3 1
This is the result commanded by 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which states in
relevant part that 'judicial proceedings [of any state court] shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or us-
age in the courts of such State."
But there is a significant exception to the doctrine of collateral
estoppel: "the Court has repeatedly recognized . . . that the con-
cept of collateral estoppel cannot apply when the party against
whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a 'full and fair
opportunity' to litigate that issue in the earlier case."'3 9 A due pro-
cess concern is at the heart of this exception." While EPA, a gov-
governmental entity, may not be entitled to the same measure of
due process that a legal person would be entitled to under the
Fifth Amendment,14 ' a court might still find that this exception to
collateral estoppel applies, meaning that the federal court is not
bound to enforce the state-court decision.
136. See Grantham v. Avondale Indus., 964 F.2d 471, 473 (5th Cir. 1992) ("It is beyond
cavil that we are not bound by a state court's interpretation of federal law regardless of
whether our jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship or a federal question." (internal
citation omitted)).
137. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984).
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
139. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980).
140. See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971)
("Some litigants-those who never appeared in a prior action-may not be collaterally es-
topped without litigating the issue. They have never had a chance to present their evidence
and arguments on the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one or more
existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their position.").
141. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 322 (1976) ("Procedural due process impos-
es constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property'
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ment." (emphasis added)).
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While this conclusion does not necessarily mean that EPA is not
bound, it does narrow in on the difficulty with making that claim.
Arguably, EPA deserves a chance to defend its regulation before it
is prevented from applying it.
On the other hand, the opinion in Thomas, discussed supra note
111, put special emphasis on the meaning and ramifications of ju-
dicial invalidation of a rule:
An order of this Court determining that a regulation imper-
missibly conflicts with the enabling statute has the effect of
invalidating or voiding the regulation, and no action whatso-
ever by the administrative agency can breathe life into the
invalidated regulation absent reversal or modification of this
Court's order by a higher court or absent legislative action
sufficiently altering the enabling act.14 1
This language leaves no room for a distinction between invali-
dated regulations that the administrative agency previously had an
opportunity to defend in court and those that it did not. In Thom-
as, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) was similarly
situated to EPA in our hypothetical; neither were joined to the ini-
tial litigation that invalidated their regulations.4 3 But perhaps a
narrower distinction can be drawn distinguishing Thomas from our
fact pattern. In Thomas, it was the state agency, the North Carolina
Department of Human Resources, that continued to apply the in-
validated regulation.'" The USDA never actually attempted such an
application, and only joined the suit as an intervenor.4 5 The court's
attention was thus directed primarily toward the state agency that
already had a fair opportunity to defend its position.
If the federal court decides that EPA should have a chance to
defend its regulation, despite the prior state-court ruling, the envi-
ronmental organization would have to work around the six-year
statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (a). Substantive challenges
to regulations, alleging lack of authority or inconsistency with stat-
ute, may be brought within six years of the agency's application of
142. Thomas v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 478 S.E.2d 816, 823 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996),
affd 485 S.E.2d 295 (N.C. 1997); see also Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against judicial
Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1354-55 & n.24 (2006) (discussing the implications of judicial
decisions that declare legislation unconstitutional, and concluding that it is uncertain
whether American courts have the authority to strike statutes out of the statute book).
143. See Thomas, 478 S.E.2d at 817-18.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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that decision to a specific challenger.'4 EPA's denial of a request
for modification would amount to an application of 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.55(b), but it is unclear to whom the regulation applies in this
circumstance. The state agency initially forwards the revised certi-
fication to EPA, which is important because a crucial part of the
argument that 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) is invalid relies on the State's
authority to protect its water quality. This suggests that EPA has ap-
plied the regulation against the State, which is probably
uninterested in challenging EPA's decisions not to modify; after all,
the state agency initially issued the lenient certification. However,
the environmental organization informally appealed EPA's deci-
sion not to modify, held the state agency to its obligations in state
court, and its members feel the effects of diminished water quality.
This is strong evidence that the regulation was applied to the envi-
ronmental organization, which is significantly more interested in
the outcome of the dispute than the public at large.4
To conclude, if EPA refuses to modify a permit after a state court
invalidates 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b), it is less than certain that a feder-
al court would force EPA to do so. Most importantly, the federal
court might insist upon conducting an independent evaluation of
the regulation's validity. There is a good chance that EPA's refusal
to modify could serve as the basis for an as-applied challenge to the
regulation in federal court.
b. State Court Applies 40 C.ER § 124.55(b)
If the state court rules that 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) is valid, after
determining that it has jurisdiction to decide that question, the
state court, in effect, would have applied 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) to
the plaintiffs. Here, it is clear that the regulation has been applied
to the environmental organization, but a new ambiguity surfaces.
Typically, the as-applied challenge allowance is discussed in terms
of the agency's application of the regulation, not a court's applica-
tion.' Our fact pattern is a unique scenario in which a court might
moot an appeal in anticipation of an agency's application. By
146. Wind River Min. Corp. v. United States, 946 F.2d 710, 716 (9th Cir. 1991); see also
Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 112 F.3d 1283 (5th Cir. 1997).
147. Cf. Wind River, 946 F.2d at 715 (supporting its decision to allow a substantive chal-
lenge to agency action outside the usual six year limitation period by noting that these
challenges, "by their nature, will often require a more 'interested' person than generally will
be found in the public at large"). This suggests that a particularized interest is at least corre-
lated with the ability to pursue an as-applied challenge to a regulation. See infra Part
III.B.3.b for a related exposition on this topic.
148. See, e.g., Wind River, 946 F.2d at 716.
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mooting the appeal, the state court has spared EPA from applying
the regulation and has applied the regulation on EPA's behalf.
A federal court would have good reason to extend the as-applied
challenge doctrine to our fact pattern. The reason courts allow
challenges to the substantive validity of regulations within six years
of their application to plaintiffs is that the grounds for such chal-
lenges are typically not apparent before their application.'49 This is
precisely the reason that 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) was not initially
challenged; it was the proverbial needle in the haystack of an
NPDES program regulatory overhaul.'50 A formalistic requirement
that the promulgating agency must have performed the applica-
tion itself would undermine the purpose of the rule. Such a
requirement would leave the environmental organization with the
burden of having the regulation applied to it but without the abil-
ity to question its validity, through no fault of its own. Thus, the
application of the regulation by the court should suffice to over-
come the statute of limitations for a challenge to the regulation in
federal court.
There are undoubtedly many more uncovered issues that would
arise in the course of litigation following a challenge to a certifica-
tion of an NPDES permit in state court. This discussion has
captured a handful of the most important. The road to invalidating
40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) may be arduous and fraught with legal obsta-
cles, but the road exists nonetheless. With determined advocates
and skillful attorneys at the wheel, there is light at the end of the
tunnel.
CONCLUSION
Once EPA issues an NPDES permit, the regulation creates a one-
way avenue for permit modification based on challenges to state
certifications-only to delete permit conditions, only at the request
of a permittee. It boldly bars modifications that would protect the
environment, while providing an open door for modifications that
do the opposite, under exactly equivalent circumstances. While
EPA must take into account the interests of law-abiding permittees
in its regulatory programs, 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(b) unlawfully sacri-
fices environmental protection in the name of administrative
149. See id. at 715 (contrasting substantive challenges to regulations with procedural
and policy based challenges by noting that the grounds for the latter categories of challeng-
es "will usually be apparent to any interested citizen within a six-year period following
promulgation of the decision").
150. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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efficiency. It is a regulation that must be repealed or invalidated if
our nation is to achieve the level of water quality for which the
Clean Water Act explicitly strives.
